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Abstract
We empirically study individual pension choice between two diﬀerent defined benefit (DB)
plans and a defined contribution (DC) plan. The DB plans diﬀer in their contribution rates and
in the way retirement benefits are calculated, as a proportion of final salary or as a proportion
of lifetime earnings. We relate labor income characteristics to the choice of pension plan.
Among other determinants of pension choice, we find that: (i) individuals who face higher
income growth are more likely to choose DB final salary plans, and less likely to choose the
DC plan; (ii) individuals who face higher earnings volatility are less likely to choose DB final
salary plans; (iii) individuals with higher earnings are more likely to choose either the DC or
the DB final salary plan. These results constitute evidence of self selection of individuals into
diﬀerent pension plans, an important issue for pension fund providers and for those involved
in pension reform.
1 Introduction
Currently in many countries the government, through the social security system, provides
a defined benefit (DB) state pension to retirees, which is linked to their lifetime earnings.
However, in the last decade, politicians and the public alike became increasingly concerned
about the sustainability of these (unfunded) pension systems. This was mainly the result of
demographic trends: increases in longevity have led to an increase in pension fund liabilities,
at the same time that decreases in birth rates have led to a decrease in contributions.3
Not surprisingly, governments have started looking into ways of resolving this underfund-
ing. One possible route is to move towards a privatized system, in which fully-funded individ-
ual retirement accounts earn market based rates of return. Advocates of this move, correctly
point out that in such a defined contribution (DC) pension system individuals are able to
allocate their retirement wealth among financial assets in a way that suits their preferences
(Feldstein and Ranguelova, 2001, Shiller, 2003).
On the other hand, advocates of DB pension systems argue that DC pensions lack the
desirable intra-generational and inter-generational risk sharing features of DB systems. They
argue that the return on the current system is low because of the overhang of unfunded
liabilities, and not because of its defined benefit nature. Past generations have received a gift
that must be paid oﬀ. What needs to be resolved is the problem of the underfunding, and
not the nature of the system. In order to do so governments of many countries have either
reduced the benefits of state pensions that retirees are entitled to receive, also through an
increase in the retirement age, or are considering doing so.
Recent pension reforms have tried to address the underfunding of DB plans and also to
provide incentives for individuals to save via DC plans so that, in several countries, includ-
ing the United States and United Kingdom, both of these types of plans coexist, and often
individuals may choose between the two. Our paper studies this choice, and the self selection
that arises as a result.
3Bohn (2001) studies the risk sharing properties of social security systems in a model with demographic
uncertainty.
1
More precisely, we study pension choice between two diﬀerent DB pension plans and a
DC plan. The DB plans diﬀer in contribution rates and in the way retirement benefits are
calculated, as a proportion of final salary or as a proportion of lifetime earnings. These
correspond to the pension choices available to many UK individuals, covered by the Family
Resources Survey (FRS).
We relate labor income characteristics including its growth rate, level and riskness to
individual pension choices. We do so in two diﬀerent ways. In the first we estimate the
characteristics of the labor income process for individuals in diﬀerent education/occupation
groups. We then relate these characteristics to the proportion of individuals in each group
who chose the DB lifetime salary, DB final salary and DC pension plan. In the second we
use individual level data, rather than by education/occupation group, to explain individual
pension choices.
Interestingly, we find evidence that individuals facing higher income growth are more likely
to join DB final salary schemes. In these plans retirement benefits are a proportion of final
salary, so that the higher is earnings growth over life the lower are contributions into the
scheme, relative to retirement benefits. On the other hand, individuals facing lower income
growth find it more attractive to contribute instead to the DC plan, if their income level is
high, or the DB lifetime earnings plan, if their income level is low.
We also find evidence that individuals facing larger income risk are less likely to choose
DB final salary pension plans. In these plans retirement benefits are a proportion of final
salary, so that they increase individuals’ exposure to their income risk. Instead, in the DB
lifetime earnings plan, retirement benefits are based on lifetime earnings, revalued using av-
erage population earnings growth, which removes in part the risk associated with individual
specific earnings growth. This explains why individuals who face higher income risk are more
likely to choose this type of pensions.
Our empirical analysis also uncovers interesting evidence on the relation between individual
assets and pension choices. We find that individuals with lower savings are more likely to
choose the pension scheme that minimizes current contributions, which is also the scheme
with the lowest retirement benefits. This is an important source of variation in the retirement
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